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Abstract 
This paper identifies the optimal two-period price sequence in the attempt for selling a good, with take-
it-or-leave-it offers, when the seller faces ambiguity about the buyers’ willingness to pay. If the first 
round fails, the seller updates its beliefs on the state of the market in accordance with Bayes rule and 
quotes a second and final price. We show that the optimal sequence of prices can be increasing. 
Furthermore, we describe the optimal sequence of prices with a myopic seller who does not update his 
beliefs in the second period. In this case, the optimal price sequence is always decreasing. 
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1 Introduction
Consider the owner of a house, or of any indivisibe object, who is willing to sell it while
facing a large number of potential buyers. This is a situation often encountered in the real
estate market when the seller does not use an auction mechanism or any other available
device, but simple sets and advertises a price, then waiting for a buyer whose reservation
price exceeds the price. In this situation, the seller is like a monopolist since, not only
he/she is the only owner of the house, but the buyers’ side he/she faces is atomistic.
Thus, the potential buyers are like price taking agents in a monopoly market. All of those
who are potential candidates to buy the house perfectly know that, if the price set by
the seller exceeds their reservation price, the seller can always wait enough time to be
sure to find another potential buyer with a reservation price larger or equal to their own
reservation price. It is a good reason to accept the price as given. Of course, there is
a penalty incurred by the seller while waiting for another potential buyer: This penalty
takes the form of the discount rate to be applied to the amount of the sale, due to the
time delay in obtaining it. This delay can be a priori very long, especially when the seller
does not know with certainty the explicit value of the reservation prices existing in the
large population of potential buyers, and when these potential buyers arrive at random
to possibly make the deal. In several circumstances, the seller cannot wait for ever before
finding a buyer whose reservation price exceeds the price. For instance, when the seller
of the house needs the amount of the sale in order to buy another one, its impatience
constrains him to sell the good in a rather short delay.
In this note, we propose a formal model capturing the essential ingredients of the above
description, and we analyse the optimal strategies for selling the house, when the seller is
uncertain about the distribution of the buyers’ willingness to pay1. .First we assume that
the seller, with one indivisible object to sell, has only two periods to succeed to sell the
house (for instance for the reason given above: the seller of the house needs the amount
of money resulting from the sale in order to buy another one). 2. Buyers are assumed to
arrive randomly, one at a time. The seller sets a price for the object, while the buyer can
either accept or reject the offer (take-it-or-leave-it offer). If the offer is accepted, then the
object is transferred at the announced price; otherwise, the process continues for a next
period, and stops afterwards. The seller can set another price in the second period. We
are interested in the optimal price sequence in this repeated retrial of selling an object,
which appears as typical in the housing market3.Then, we examine how a myopic seller,
1Uncertainty about the distribution of an event is often referred to as ambiguity, distinguishing between
known (the probability and payoff are precise) and unknown (ambiguity in the probability and/or payoff)
uncertainty.
2This is assumed to be private information available to the seller but not to the potential buyers.
3Because our attention is focused in the housing market we do not assume an auction mechanism as
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who does not update his/her a priori beliefs, would select the optimal price sequence.
One could think that a first rejection should induce the seller of the house to increase the
chances to sell it by reducing the price in the second trial. Surprisingly, we show that,
even if this is always the case when the seller is myopic, the price of the house can well
increase when the seller updates his beliefs in a Bayesian way.To do so, we first consider
a selling process in which a sophisticated seller learns from a first rejection to buy, and
updates a` la Bayes his/her beliefs concerning the distribution of the willingness to pay
over the buyers’ population.Our main motivation is to answer the following question: does
a rational seller always decrease its price in the second period? Surprisingly we show that,
in several cases, a Bayesian seller is willing to increase its price at the second period.
Most of the literature related to the above problem is formulated assuming the context
of bilateral trade with one seller and one buyer bargaining about the exchange price.
This context is very different from the one adopted here and resorts to game theory as
the natural analytical instrument to develop models capturing this bilateral situation
(see Rubinstein (1982), Binmore (1980), Chatterjee and Samuelson (1980), Crawford
(1981), Sobel and Takahashi (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983)). In particluar,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) build a bilateral sequential bargaining game and use the
concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. These authors focus on issues of commitment
and information transfer in a game where both the seller and the buyer update their beliefs
about their opponents in accordance with Bayes rule. In this paper, Fudenberg and Tirole
(1983) do also obtain the surprising result of prices increasing over time but such a result is
due to the combination of information transfer and the lack of precommitment embodied
in the perfectness of the definition of the equilibria. Even if our context is very different,
we have identified a similar property, in a much simpler setup.
2 The model
Consider a unit of an indivisible good, such as a house. The owner of the good who wants
to sell it receives each period the visit of a potential buyer, whose reservation price is
equal to λ, a random variable.
Assume that the seller faces ambiguity concerning the state of the market. More
specifically, the seller does not know whether the willingness to pay λ of buyers is dis-
tributed uniformly over the distribution [0, λ], the narrow range distribution, or over the
distribution [0, λ¯], the wide range distribution, with λ¯ > λ. Thus, the range of reservation
prices either includes only rather low values for the object or, on the contrary, extends to
include also higher values. Define F¯ (λ) the cumulative function of the first distribution
in Myerson (1981) who describe a mechanism typical of art objects auctions.
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and F (λ) the cumulative function of the second:
F¯ (λ) =
{
λ
λ¯
for λ < λ¯
1 for λ > λ¯
and F (λ) =
{
λ
λ
for λ < λ
1 for λ > λ.
Before the transaction takes place, the seller believes that, with probability pi0 the wide
range distribution is the good one. Then, the probability that a visitor has a willingness
to pay smaller than λ is given by
H0(λ) =

pi0
λ
λ¯
+ (1− pi0)λλ for 0 < λ < λ
pi0
λ
λ¯
+ (1− pi0) for λ < λ < λ¯
1 for λ¯ < λ.
In the following we shall restrict the analysis to the case when pi0 ∈ [0, 14 ]∪]12 , 1]4.
Assume that the seller sets in period zero a price p0 to his/her first visitor, and that
the transaction fails. Then, clearly, the willingness to buy of the visitor is smaller than
p0. Hence, if the price announced is p0, the transaction fails with probability H0(p0). In
case of failure to sell in the first round, the seller learns from this event and can update
his/her prior on probability pi0 according to the following rule:
pi1(p0) = P (λ¯|λ < p0) = P (λ < p0|λ¯)pi0
P (λ < p0|λ¯)pi0 + P (λ < p0|λ)(1− pi0)
= F¯ (p0)
pi0
H0(p0)
.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish two cases: (a) the price announced p0 is smaller
than the highest value of willingness to pay in narrow range distribution i.e. λ; (b) the
price announced p0 is higher than λ
5.
Case a p0 < λ. It follows that the updated probability pi
a
1(p0) is given by
pia1(p0) =
λpi0
λpi0 + (1− pi0)λ¯
. (1)
Case b p0 ≥ λ. Then, the updated probability pib1(p0) is given by
pib1(p0) =
p0pi0
p0pi0 + (1− pi0)λ¯
. (2)
The cumulative distribution of the first period H1(λ) is as H0(λ) but now the probability
that the wide range distribution is the good one is pi1,with pi1 = pi
a
1 if p0 < λ and pi1 = pi
b
1
if p0 ≥ λ.
4This condition simplifies considerably the analysis. However, the optimal choice could easily be ob-
tained without it.
5Notice that a rejection to buy when p0 > λ, does not provide full information on the distribution of
buyer because the two distributions overlap.
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Our main concern consists in comparing the price quoted by the seller before the
possible rejection of his/her first proposal and the price quoted ex-post, when rejection
has taken place and the resulting information is taken into account via the Bayesian
revision of the probability related to the willingness to pay distribution. In particular,
we want to examine whether Bayesian revision always implies a decrease in the optimal
price between period 0 and period 1, as one would expect a priori; or, on the contrary,
whether an increasing optimal sequence could occur. To this end, we fully develop the
payoff maximization solution for all admissible values of the parameters and we use this
analysis to explore the properties of the optimal price sequence. Afterwards, we compare
these properties with those arising in the case of a myopic seller.
The optimization problem is solved backwards assuming that the price p0 has been
selected in period zero.
2.1 Payoff maximisation in period one
Let the price p0 be announced in period one. Then, the revision of the guess on the
distribution of buyers yields pi1 as given by (1) or (2), which defines H1(p1).In the second
period, the seller maximizes its payoff Π1(p1) = p1(1 − H1(p1)). Under the condition
λ
λ¯
> 1− 1
2pi1
, p∗1 < λ, the candidate optimal price p
∗
1 is
p∗1(pi1) =
1
2
λ¯λ
λpi1 + λ¯(1− pi1)
. (3)
The corresponding payoff is
Π1 (pi1) =
1
4
λ¯λ
λpi1 + λ¯(1− pi1)
.
When λ
λ¯
< 1
2
, then, p∗∗1 > λ. Hence, the candidate optimal price p
∗∗
1 is
p∗∗1 (pi1) =
λ¯
2
, (4)
with corresponding payoff
Π1(pi1) =
λ¯
4
pi1.
It is possible to check that Π1(p
∗∗
1 (pi1)) > Π1(p
∗
1(pi1)) iff
λ
λ¯
< pi1
1+pi1
. Thus, provided that
the inequality λ
λ¯
< pi1
1+pi1
holds6, the seller announces in the second trial to sell the house,
a price equal to p∗∗1 (pi1) =
λ¯
2
. Otherwise the optimal price in the second trial is given by
p∗1(pi1).
Depending on the price level p0 set in the first period, the revision of the prior differs.
Therefore, we have two cases.
6Notice that pi11+pi1 ∈]1− 12pi1 , 12 [.
5
Case a p0 < λ, Substituting the expression of pi
a
1(p0) in the ratio
pi1
1+pi1
, we obtain
pi1 =
λpi0
λpi0 + (1− pi0)λ¯
.
Note that in this case the probability pi1 is always smaller than pi0. Hence, after a rejection
of a price that is smaller than λ, the seller decreases the probability with which he believes
that the good distribution has as support the interval [0, λ¯].
Case b p0 > λ, Substituting pi1 in (4) we get
pi1 =
p0pi0
p0pi0 + (1− pi0)λ¯
.
where similarly to above pi1 is always smaller than pi0. Hence, regardless how small is the
price quoted in period zero, a rejection decreases the probability that the true distribution
is the wide range one. It is not so surprising that rejection in period 0, puts a downward
pressure in the belief of the seller about the domain of buyers’ preferences for the object
on sale.
Summarizing the two cases
Lemma If p0 < λ,the optimal price sequence in the second period is given by p
∗∗
1a =
λ¯
2
for all λ
λ¯
∈ [0, λpi0
2λpi0+(1−pi0)λ¯ ] and p
∗
1a =
λ¯λ
2
λpi0+λ¯(1−pi0)
λ2pi0+λ¯
2
(1−pi0) otherwise. If p0 > λ, the equilib-
rium price p
∗∗
1 =
λ¯
2
for all λ
λ¯
∈ [0, p0pi0
2p0pi0+(1−pi0)λ¯ ] and p
∗
1b =
λ¯λ
2
p0pi0+λ¯(1−pi0)
p0λpi0+λ¯
2
(1−pi0) otherwise.
2.2 Payoff maximization in period zero
The payoff in the first period writes as
Π0 = (1−H0(p0))p0 +H0(p0)Π1(p0)
Solving the first order conditions, the candidate payoff maximizing prices are given by7
p∗0 =
1
2
λ¯λ(1 + pi0
4
)
λpi0 + (1− pi0)λ¯
if pi0 < 1/4 for any
λ¯
λ
;if pi0 > 1/2 for
λ¯
λ
< 8pi0
9pi0−4 . The candidate price is
p∗∗0 =
5
8
λ¯
if λ¯
λ
> 8
5
.
7Notice that 85 <
8pi0
9pi0−4 when pi0 > 1/2.
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Hence, provided that pi0 < 1/4, we have to compare the payoffs when
λ¯
λ
> 8
5
. Instead,
if pi0 > 1/2, we have to compare the payoffs when
8
5
< λ¯
λ
< 8pi0
9pi0−4 . The payoff Π0(p
∗
0) and
Π0(p
∗∗
0 ) writes as {
Π0(p
∗
0) = (
1
2
+ pi0
8
)2 λ¯λ
λpi0+(1−pi0)λ¯
Π0(p
∗∗
0 ) = (
5
8
)2λ¯pi0
It is possible to show that Π0(p
∗
0) > Π0(p
∗∗
0 ) iff
λ¯
λ
> 8
25
2+3pi0
pi0
. We can also easily show that
8
25
2+3pi0
pi0
< 8pi0
9pi0−4 when pi0 > 1/2 and
8
25
2+3pi0
pi0
> 8
5
for all pi0. Hence, we can summarize the
optimal sequence of prices as follows:
Lemma If λ¯
λ
∈
[
8
5
, 8
25
2+3pi0
pi0
]
, the optimal price sequence is
{
p∗0 =
5
8
λ¯; p∗1 =
λ¯
2
}
. The
same optimal sequence applies in the set [ 8pi0
9pi0−4 ,∞[ if pi0 > 12 . In all other cases, the
optimal price sequence is
{
p∗0 =
1
2
λ¯λ(1+
pi0
4
)
λpi0+(1−pi0)λ¯ ; p
∗
1 =
λ¯
2
}
.
Now we are equipped with the needed information to study the behavior of prices in the
optimal sequence, in particular whether this optimal sequence could be increasing. Using
the above Lemma 2 to compare prices of the first period with prices of the second period
we observe that the optimal sequence of pricing
{
p∗0 =
5
8
λ¯; p∗1 =
λ¯
2
}
is always decreasing.
Nevertheless, comparison of prices in the sequence
{
p∗0 =
1
2
λ¯λ(1+
pi0
4
)
λpi0+(1−pi0)λ¯ ; p
∗
1 =
λ¯
2
}
reveals
the following property :
Proposition 1 Assume a Bayesian seller. When pi0 <
1
4
, the price set by the seller
increases from period zero to period one if λ¯
λ
∈ [ (4−3pi0)
4(1−pi0) ,
8pi0
9pi0−4 ]. When pi0 >
1
2
then the
optimal price sequence is increasing if λ¯
λ
> (4−3pi0)
4(1−pi0) .
Proof. We compare p∗0 =
1
2
λ¯λ
λpi0+(1−pi0)λ¯(1 +
pi0
4
) and p∗1 =
λ¯
2
, which can be an optimal se-
quence of prices in the set λ¯
λ
∈
[
8
25
2+3pi0
pi0
, 8pi0
9pi0−4
]
when pi0 >
1
2
and they are defined in the set
λ¯
λ
∈
(
8
25
2+3pi0
pi0
,+∞
[
when pi0 <
1
4
. Such prices satisfy p∗0 < p
∗
1 if
λ¯
λ
> (4−3pi0)
4(1−pi0) . This inequal-
ity can be satisfied for pi0 >
1
2
or pi0 <
1
4
because
[
(4−3pi0)
4(1−pi0) ,
8pi0
9pi0−4
]
∩
[
8
25
2+3pi0
pi0
, 8pi0
9pi0−4
]
6= 0
and (4−3pi0)
4(1−pi0) <
8
25
2+3pi0
pi0
. A numerical illustration corresponding to the case pi0 is small is
the following. Let pi0 = 0.2, λ¯ = 505, and λ = 100. Then,
λ¯
λ
= 5. 05 /∈ [8
5
; 4.16
]
, and
p∗0 = 62. 529 while p
∗
1 = 252.5. Another example corresponding to the case where pi0 >
1
2
is pi0 = 0.55, λ¯ = 135 and λ = 100. In this case,
λ¯
λ
= 1.35 /∈ [8
5
; 2.12
]
U [4.63,∞[ while
p∗0 = 66. 334 and p
∗
1 = 67. 5.Q.E.D.
The increase in the price announced in the second trial is the result of different forces.
Consider first the situation where the probability assigned to the wide range distribution
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is low, i.e. pi0 <
1
4
. Were the difference between the two distributions not large, the seller
would choose to lower the price in the second trial since, as shown above, pi1 is smaller
than pi0, which reinforces the weight of the narrow range distribution in the relative
likelihood between the two events. But the difference between the two distributions can
be very large. Accordingly, this difference can be so large that it can countervail the weak
probability that the wide range distribution is the good one. As a consequence, it can
induce the seller to increase the price, in spite of the low probability assigned to the wide
range distribution, to take advantage of a possible high-willingness to pay buyer in the
second period.
Now consider the case when pi0 is not very different, but larger, than
1
2
. Then, the fact
that both distributions are likely the same, a high value of pi1 would normally lead the
seller to believe that the wide range distribution is the true one. Therefore, the optimal
sequence can be increasing even when the two distributions are quite similar.
3 Optimal prices with a myopic seller
The forces defining the optimal choice of prices are dictated by the fact that the seller
anticipates in period 0 what can happen in period 1. It is therefore interesting to com-
pare the choice of a Bayesian seller with that of a myopic one who does not exploit the
information resulting from the first trial.
3.1 Payoff maximization in the second period
Consider that the price p0 is set in period 0 and that no revision is made concerning the
distribution of buyers.
In the second period, the seller maximizes its payoff Π1(p1) given by
Π1(p1) = p1(1−H0(p1))
where H1(p1) is the same as H0(p0).
H0(λ) = H1(λ) =

pi0
λ
λ¯
+ (1− pi0)λλ for 0 < λ < λ
pi0
λ
λ¯
+ (1− pi0) for λ < λ < λ¯
1 for λ¯ < λ
Hence the price selected in the second period is given by
p∗1 =
1
2
λ¯λ
λpi0 + λ¯(1− pi0)
, (5)
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which is the optimal price if the payoff is decreasing in p1 = λ, 1− 2λ(pi0λ¯ + 1−pi0λ ) < 0⇔
λ
λ¯
> 1− 1
2pi0
. The corresponding payoff is
Π1(p
∗
1) =
1
4
λ¯λ
λpi0 + λ¯(1− pi0)
If the payoff is increasing in p1, p1 = λ,i.e.
λ
λ¯
< 1
2
, then
p∗∗1 =
λ¯
2
(6)
is the optimal price, with corresponding payoff
Π1(p
∗∗
1 ) =
λ¯
4
pi0.
It is easy to verify that Π1(p
∗
1) ≷ Π1(p∗∗1 ) iff λλ¯ ≶
pi0
1+pi0
.
3.2 Payoff Maximization in the first period
The payoff in the first period writes as
Π0 = (1−H0(p0))p0 +H0(p0)Π1(p1).
where the expression of Π1(p1) shall be substituted either with Π1(p
∗
1) or with Π1(p
∗∗
1 )
according as λ
λ¯
≶ pi0
1+pi0
. The solution of first order conditions yields the price in period 1
as
p∗0 =

5
8
λ¯λ
λ¯(1−pi0)+λpi0 for 0 < λ < λ
1
8
λ¯λ(4λ¯−4λ¯pi0+5λpi0)
(λ¯(pi0−1)−λpi0)2
for λ < λ < λ¯
. (7)
Direct comparison of prices in the candidate optimal sequences of prices reveals that
Proposition 2 Assume a myopic seller. The price of the house in the second period
always decreases.
Proof. We compare the expression of p∗0 in (7) with the expressions (5) and (6) which
shows that the price quoted in the second period is always small than the price in the
first period.
This could explain why most sellers probably do decrease prices when they face a
rejection at their first trial. Of course, other explanations concur to reinforce this phe-
nomenon, like the existence of a discount rate and/or the belief that a lower price is a
piece of information that would be spread fastly among the potential buyers.
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4 Conclusion
This note tackles a problem which has fascinated economists since a long period of time. It
can be formulated in many contexts, differing by their assumptions and the difficulties of
its treatment. In some sense we have chosen the simplest one since we have assumed that
(i) one side of the market consists of a single agent behaving rationally, while the other
one consist of a continuum of agents who behave myopically; (ii) only one buyer arrives
at a time; and (iii) there are only two periods where the seller can meet a potential buyer.
We feel that these assumptions might correspond to several situations encountered in the
housing markets. Probably the most awkward among these assumptions is the third one.
Generalizing our approach to an extended set-up accepting a priori an arbitrary number
of periods with the existence of a discounting rate constitutes a natural field for further
research.
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